Once hailed as a model of moderate pluralism, Bangladesh is now teetering on the edge—politically, socially, and strategically. What unfolds in Dhaka over the coming months will reverberate far beyond its borders, with consequences for South Asia, the Indo-Pacific, and the global democratic order.
In August 2024, a student-led uprising toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after 15 years of increasingly authoritarian rule. Protesters packed Shahbagh Square—a symbolic epicenter of past democratic movements—demanding justice, accountability, and a new political beginning. Amid the power vacuum, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus emerged as interim leader—a globally respected figure tasked with guiding the country toward democratic renewal.
But nearly a year later, that transition is faltering. Yunus’s political support is fraying, exclusionary politics creeping back in, and authoritarian and radical forces are regrouping. What began as a hopeful civic uprising may be devolving into a cautionary tale.
A Fragile Transition Under Strain
Initially, Yunus garnered rare consensus among civil society leaders, student coalitions, and opposition parties. But the roadmap to elections is now under serious strain.
A 13 June agreement between Yunus and exiled Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Tarique Rahman—reportedly signed in London—has apparently set a February 2026 election date.
Crucially, however, the deal excluded both the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami and the rapidly growing National Citizen Party (NCP), each of which commands significant rural support.
The exclusion has drawn backlash. Student groups that spearheaded the “August Revolution” accuse Yunus of backroom dealmaking and betraying the promise of inclusive reform. Meanwhile, the military—still influential after its caretaker role from 2006 to 2008—is privately pushing for elections by December 2025, citing the precedent of the 1991 democratic handover.
Adding to the uncertainty, vital electoral reforms remain incomplete. An estimated 15 million new voters—many of them first-time or rural youth—are still missing from the rolls. Without that update, any election risks being seen as illegitimate or lacking people’s mandate, regardless of the timeline or outcome.
High Cost of Political Bans & Rising Radical Undercurrent
In May 2025, Yunus’s government suspended the Awami League under Bangladesh’s Anti-Terrorism Act, citing allegations of violence and pending charges before the International Crimes Tribunal. While the party had centralised power under Hasina, it still commands vast grassroots networks—particularly among women’s cooperatives, labor unions, and secular youth movements.
The ban drew swift international condemnation. On June 16, UN Human Rights Commissioner Volker Türk warned that the exclusion of major political actors “undermines the very pluralism democracy requires.”
Rather than clearing space for renewal, this exclusion is creating a dangerous vacuum—one that can increasingly be filled by radicalised elements.
On 1 June, Bangladesh’s Supreme Court reinstated Jamaat-e-Islami’s political registration—overturning a 2013 ban on constitutional grounds. With its legal status restored, Jamaat is poised for a return to the political mainstream.
That should alarm observers. The party actively opposed Bangladesh’s 1971 independence and has well-documented ties to regional extremist networks. Even during its formal exclusion, Jamaat maintained a strong covert presence—particularly in rural madrassas and urban informal networks.
More troubling still are unverified reports that Yunus’s government has quietly released individuals previously convicted of serious crimes, including some linked to political violence during Hasina’s tenure. As radical elements reassert themselves, minority communities—especially Hindus and Buddhists—report heightened fear and intimidation.
Bangladesh’s secular consensus is at risk of unraveling.
Warning for India & Test for Global Democracy
For India, this isn’t a distant crisis. Dhaka sits at the heart of New Delhi’s Act East policy, serves as a key maritime partner in the Bay of Bengal, and provides a crucial buffer to insurgency-prone Northeast India. The large Indian state of West Bengal, for both historical and geographic reasons, is especially exposed to developments across the Padma River basin.
Yet, India’s strategic positioning remains uncertain. A reported $2.1 billion Chinese investment package—including Mongla Port modernisation, a China-backed Economic Zone, and infrastructure grants—suggests Yunus may be tilting toward Beijing. Simultaneous diplomatic overtures to Pakistan only deepen Indian unease.
India’s long-standing association with the Awami League—while historically valuable—may now be a liability if it continually reinforces perceptions of partisanship. Former Prime Minister Hasina’s refuge in India, and her public appeals from exile, complicate the optics further.
To avoid being outflanked and marginalised in its own backyard, India must act—strategically, firmly, and conditionally:
Link economic incentives—including garment export quotas and energy cooperation—to clear governance and inclusion benchmarks. Fast-track connectivity projects: Mongla Port access, Northeast border transit routes, and joint power corridors.
Discourage extremist inclusion by urging the BNP to build broader coalitions that explicitly exclude Jamaat and other regressive forces—potentially by integrating disaffected Awami League and leftist elements. This is not undue interference. It is strategic self-preservation.
Bangladesh is the world’s eighth-most populous country, a climate-vulnerable delta, and a potential economic bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Its collapse—or consolidation—will shape refugee flows, radicalisation trends, and regional trade routes.
A pluralist, democratic Bangladesh could serve as a bulwark against the authoritarian tide rising from Beijing to Naypyidaw. A fractured or radicalised Bangladesh, on the other hand, would embolden Pakistan’s military-intelligence complex, entrench China’s eastern influence, and shatter the democratic arc stretching from Sri Lanka to Thailand.
Yet global attention remains dangerously low—diverted by wars in Gaza, Ukraine, and now the escalating Iran–Israel crisis. The Yunus-led transition was born of protest and hope—for justice, reform, and inclusion. That hope still flickers. But it is dimming.“
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.”
— Brutus, Julius Caesar, Act IV, Scene 3
For Bangladeshis, for its neighbors, and for global democracy, such is this moment. The tide is at flood. It must be seized—principled, strategic, and unwavering.
(Manoj Mohanka follows Sino-India-Pakistan geopolitics closely and serves on corporate boards. This is an opinion piece and the views expressed above are the author’s own. The Quint neither endorses nor is responsible for the same.)